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Leadership with Trustworthy Associates
Torun Dewan1 Francesco Squintani2
April 2017.
Abstract. Group members value informed decisions and hold ideological preferences.
A leader takes a decision on their behalf. Good leadership depends on characteristics
of moderation and judgement. The latter emerges (endogenously) via advice communi-
cated by “trustworthy associates”. Trustworthy advice requires ideological proximity
to the leader. A group may choose a relatively extreme leader with a large number of
such associates. Paradoxically, this can happen though it is in the group’s collective
interest to choose a moderate leader. To assess whether these insights persist when
political groups compete, we embed our analysis in a model of elections. Each of two
parties chooses a leader who implements her preferred policy if elected. A party may
choose an extreme leader who defeats a moderate candidate chosen by the opposing
party. Our results highlight the importance of party cohesion and the relations be-
tween a leader and her party. These can be more important to electoral success than
proximity of a leader’s position to the median voter.
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2E la prima coniettura che si fa del cervello d’uno signore, e´ vedere li uomini che lui ha d’intorno.
Niccolo’ Machiavelli, Il Principe, Ch. 22.
1. INTRODUCTION
Who should rule? Which individual characteristics are required for good and successful lead-
ership? These questions are central to political writing and thought. They are addressed in
Plato’s Republic and, perhaps most famously, in Machiavelli’s masterpiece Il Principe. A cen-
tral contention of Machiavelli is that good governance stems from the characteristics of a ruler
and that these determine political success. This view is shared by contemporary political sci-
entists. Since Stokes (1963), studies have recognized the importance to electoral success of a
candidates’ valence– a term used to describe competence, talent, good judgement, or honesty,
that are generally desirable qualities of a leader.3
These leadership characteristics might be seen as innate. According to the social historian
Thomas Carlyle leaders (or heroes in his terminology) were made rather than born. Alterna-
tively such characteristics might be the product of education and training. Plato, for example,
believed the education of future leaders to be a core function of the state. There is, however,
a different view. Core leadership characteristics may stem from the relations a leader enjoys
with others in the governance process and the advise that she obtains from them. We find this
perspective in Aristotle who, in Politics III.16, 1287 27-35, argues that advice from friends is
central to a leader’s judgement:
“It would perhaps be accounted strange if someone, when judging with one pair of eyes
and one pair of ears, and acting with one pair of feet and hands, could see better than
many people with many pairs, since, as things stand, monarchs provide themselves
with many eyes, ears, hands and feet. For they appoint as co-rulers those who are
friends to themselves and to their rule. If they are not his friends, they will not do
as the monarch chooses. But suppose they are friends to him and to his rule well, a
friend is someone similar and equal, so if he thinks they should rule, he must think
that those who are equal and similar to her should rule like him.”
A related theme emerges in Machiavelli’s masterpiece, Il Principe. In chapter 22, he writes on
knowledge acquisition and making use of trusted advisors. There, he famously argues that:
“The first opinion that one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is by observing
the men he has around him.”
One interpretation, according to the idiom “a person is known for the company she seeks,”
suggests that we infer a leader’s quality from the type of person she associates with. Another,
perhaps more intriguing interpretation, is that a leader’s qualities arise because of those she
3See McCurley and Mondak (1995); Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001); Burden (2004); Stone and Simas
(2010), amongst others.
3associates with.4Machiavelli entertains this second interpretation, attributing the greatness
of Pandolfo Petrucci, prince of Siena, to the relationship she enjoyed with her valent minister
Antonio da Venafro. Indeed, Machiavelli highlights that Pandolfo’s ability as a ruler depended
upon the information and good judgement provided by Antonio. 5
In this paper we develop a novel theory of leadership that relates a leader’s judgement to the
links she enjoys through association with others in the governance process. These relations
can benefit a leader and enhance group welfare. Generally, one might think of intra-group
linkages as facilitating financial transactions, the flow of information to a leader, and/or as
helping build trust, all of which can benefit the group. Building on the insights of Aristotle,
Machiavelli and others, we analyze the relations a leader forms with other group members
whose advise she may benefit from. Such advise can help her form better judgement and so
take more informed decisions. But, for this to be so, a leader must be able to trust the advise
obtained. That is, the advise must be truthful.
To explore this notion of leadership we analyze a group that collectively chooses a leader
who is granted authority to take a decision on their behalf. Players’ payoffs depend on an
uncertain state of the world about which each is independently, privately, and imperfectly
informed. Each, however, has different preferred outcomes that reflect their idiosyncratic
ideological preferences. After the leader is chosen, but before the decision is taken, group
members may advise the leader, whoever she or she may be. Such advise takes the form of
cheap-talk communication.
First, we study the endogenous formation of a leader’s network of trustworthy associates:
those the leader can rely upon for truthful advise. The results are intuitive. We show that a
leader can rely on truthful advice only from those whose ideological preference is similar to
her own. Taking the next step we show that a leader’s judgement depends upon the number
of trustworthy associates that she has. A larger group of such associates translates into more
informed decisions. This intuitive result establishes our take on the Machiavellian lesson: A
leader’s wisdom and judgement are determined by those she has around her. And it resonates
with Aristotle’s claim: a good leader has many friends, who are ideologically similar to her,
and whose advise she benefits from.6 Thus we find that the support of friends, that is of course
4A different interpretation is that an instrinsically good leader is not threatened even when surrounded by highly
capable, if potentially hostile, associates. For example, Kearns Goodwin (2005) relates the political genius of
Abraham Lincoln to her ability in forming a cabinet consisting of erstwhile rivals to her Presidency.
5These two prominent examples develop the theme that reliable advice from friends, allies, and associates leads
to better judgement and successful leadership. This view was in fact quite general in the Middle Ages. Recent
analysis of a collection of the “mirror for princes” texts (a class of texts offering advise on governance, developed in
both Christian Europe and the Islamic world in the Middle Ages, of which Machiavelli’s work is the most famous)
uses state of the art text-as-data measurement techniques developed by political scientists (Blaydes, Grimmer, and
McQueen, 2013). This textual analysis reveals a prominent theme referring to the characteristics of exemplary
rulers, such as their moderation (or temperance) and judgement. Within this theme, a main subtopic highlights
the importance of a leader’s relations with others.
6There are likely many reasons why politicians are more effective when assisting a leader with whom they share
similar views. Our model of advice may be taken as a partial microfoundation for this stylized fact.
4necessary in order to defeat opponents in the quest for leadership, also provides a source for
better and more effective leadership.
In light of these results, we then ask: what are the characteristics of a good leader? She is
defined as the one that the group should choose when maximizing their joint welfare. In line
with the classic texts we find that moderation (or temperance) is desirable. Nevertheless, a
good leader relies on her judgement that is determined by the number of allies in her cir-
cle. Depending on the distribution of ideological views in the group, a moderate leader may
be isolated in that that she cannot rely on anyone’s advice. Thus a tradeoff arises between
moderation, on the one hand, and judgement on the other.
Our model delivers a simple mathematical equation that describes this potential tradeoff and
the optimal choice of leader. This equation reveals that the tradeoff is related to different
properties of the distribution of views in the group. A leader’s moderation is understood
with respect to the entire spectrum of views. Her judgement, by contrast, depends upon the
concentration of viewpoints similar to her own. Put otherwise, moderation relates to “global”
properties of the ideology distribution, while judgement is related to “local” ones.
What then are the characteristics of the chosen leader? Although individual preferences in
our model are not single-peaked, so we cannot use a straightforward application of Black’s
Theorem, majority choice is determined by the median politician. This follows from the fact
that the group preference satisfies a single-crossing condition. Since the majority choice is
determined by the median player, one might expect a moderate leader to be chosen. On the
other hand, a leaders network is also an important consideration. Indeed we find, in line with
common intuition and the practical wisdom of Aristotle, that a leader may be chosen because
she has many friends. Here, these friends act as a leader’s trustworthy associates (or “mouths
and ears” in Aristotle’s terminology). In line with Aristotle’s view, a large network of friends
translates into better judgement. A direct prediction stems from this. The group leader may
in fact be be relatively extreme. Indeed, this is so when ideological opinions are concentrated
at the extremes.
Next, we compare the group’s choice of leader under majority rule with the optimal choice.
In doing so we address an issue raised by Levi and Ahlquist (2011) in their survey of the
literature. They note that “leadership does not always improve aggregate welfare and we
need to know more about the conditions under which it does and it does not.” On this point,
we show that the chosen leader maximizes aggregate welfare when the ideology of group
members is clustered around the median. However, when ideologies are more dispersed then
leadership fails to improve aggregate welfare. More precisely, a social planner would have
that the group choose a different leader.
Perhaps it is unsurprising that the group may choose the wrong leader from a welfare perspec-
tive. It is of course well known that majority rule can lead to suboptimal outcomes. Deeper
insights emerge once we recognize our model as one of implicit (strategic) delegation, as first
5analyzed by Schelling (1960). The incentive of the median politician to delegate arises when
another politician has more trustworthy associates and so will take a more informed decision.
When choosing whether to delegate, however, the median considers only her own preferences.
Moreover, the weight she places on leadership attributes (moderation and judgement) may
differ from the optimal ones. A surprising consequence is that she may delegate to a rel-
atively extreme leader when a more moderate one (such as herself) would better serve the
group interest. The upshot of this result is a reversal of the famous “ally principle,’ which
states that delegation should take place to an ally who is as close as possible to the principal.7
A surprising implication, from a welfare perspective, is that the group choice places too much
emphasis on a leader’s judgment, and too little on her moderation.
A useful exercise is to consider how the group’s choice of leader changes when the preferences
of its members change. This might occur due to transition in the group’s membership or from
exogenous shocks to members’ preferences. In models of collective choice that build on Black’s
celebrated theorem only the identity (and hence opinion) of the median (player or committee
member) matters for decisions made. Consequently, any change to the distribution of views
within a group that leaves the identity of the median unchanged has no effect on policy out-
comes. Although Black’s theorem holds with respect to leadership choice, our comparative
static analysis produces sharply different predictions to those of that canonical model. We
find that changes in the ideological views of group members can affect leadership and hence
policy choice even though they do not alter the identity of the “global” median player. This
result stems from the fact that such ideological change affects the size of a leader’s network of
trustworthy associates. If some players become more extreme (moderate) in their views then
a moderate (extreme) leader may loose important allies and can no longer benefit from their
advise. This affects her ability to exercise good judgement and hence her prospects of being
chosen.
These new theoretical results shed light on empirical questions arising from applications of
the spatial model in political science. Consider, for example, work analyzing appointments
made by the President to the Supreme Court that are approved by the Senate (Krehbiel,
2007; Rohde and Shepsle, 2007). These models of complete information, based on Blacks’ the-
orem, assess the sequentially rational behaviour of senate members who anticipate the policy
impact of such appointments. Specifically, a rational senate member considers whether a pro-
posed appointee changes the identity of the median court member. She is the critical player,
since, “an opinion must gain the assent of four justices, the median justice and four justices
on one side or another” (Rohde and Shepsle, 2007). This reasoning does not sit well with com-
mon intuition that the viewpoints of all players are relevant to decision-making. Moreover,
empirical evidence on Supreme Court appointments is in line with this intuition. The spe-
cific ideology of the President’s nominee matters, in fact, and in ways that confound spatial
reasoning. The evidence shows that extreme justices are less likely to have their nomination
7See Jonathan Bendor and Hammond (2001) for a review of this literature.
6confirmed. Clark (2012) reviews this literature and notes that the facts are difficult to rec-
oncile with existing theoretical models. He argues that an explanation requires relaxing the
complete information assumption that underpins those models. Our analysis suggests that
his conjecture is correct. Indeed our model of decision-making in small groups with incom-
plete information supports the common intuition that the viewpoints of all group members
are relevant to decisions that are made. Moreover, and as a consequence, were an external
body (such as a Senate) to consider strategic appointments to a group (such as a court), then
the set of nominees rejected would be larger than that predicted by a model in which only the
median matters.
The main body of our paper explores the idea that a leader’s judgement depends on her close
associates and so, in turn, on the local distribution of preferences in the group. Next we check
whether the empirical consequences of that assertion are robust when considering electoral
competition between groups. To explore this, we study internal leadership contests (involv-
ing politicians, members, and/or registered voters) in two parties whose leaders then contest
a general election after which the winner implements her preferred policies. A conjecture
is that our surprising findings will disappear with competition that (as illustrated in the
classic spatial model of Downs) provides incentives for parties to moderate their position.
While that conjecture is correct in the absence of (strategic) communication within parties, it
no longer holds true when a leader’s judgement depends upon advise obtained from others.
When this is so then all of our previous insights hold: parties may choose relatively extreme
leaders even when more moderate candidates are available and, moreover, doing so can en-
hance their chances of electoral victory. In fact, and surprisingly, our results are stronger as
a consequence of competition. That is, there exist circumstances in which the most moderate
available political would be elected as leader in the absence of electoral competition (i.e., if
all politicians belong to a single group), whereas two-party competition would cause to the
election of relatively extreme leader.
A surprising comparative static prediction of our model involves the ideological direction of
leadership change. A rightward shift in the ideology of a party politician can have an opposite
effect on leadership choice, making it more likely that a leftist leader is chosen, and vice-
versa. This non-monotonicity has further unexpected implications when considering party
competition. We find that a party can turn a winning (losing) situation into a losing (winning)
one when moderates (extremists) become more moderate (extreme). Moreover we illustrate
how a political leader can turn a potential winning situation into a losing one by moderating
her policy position: in so doing she reduces her leadership potential, becoming isolated, less
well-placed to benefit from the advise of others in her party, and unable to deliver informed
policies.
Bringing these insights together reveals the importance of a party’s cohesion on its electoral
success. Our results suggests that the electoral success of relatively moderate leaders is not
due to their moderation per se, but the fact that their parties are cohesive. Correspondingly,
7we argue that the success of moderate leaders (e.g., Tony Blair and Bill Clinton) can be re-
lated to the fact that key figures in their party had moderated their own opinions. Indeed
excerpts from Blair’s autobiography suggest that his judgement during his first term in office
depended upon the advise that was provided by trustworthy allies (such as David Blunkett)
who themselves had moved from the hard to the centre-left of the party.
2. OUR CONTRIBUTION TO THE RELATED LITERATURE
While we shall comment on and discuss our contributions throughout, here we precede our
analysis by briefly pointing out some of the main related literature and themes. In developing
our theory of leadership where a leader is connected via a network, we contribute to a small
but growing formal literature that develops different notions of leadership. Hermalin (1998)
develops the notion of leading by example whereby a leader provides a costly signal that
aligns followers’ incentives with her own. Dewan and Myatt (2008) develop the notion of focal
leadership that draws on earlier work by Schelling (1960) and Calvert (1995). 8 Canes-Wrone,
Herron, and Shotts (2001) draw a distinction between “leadership”–the act of implementing
a policy that a leader believes to be correct– and “pandering” to a majority. Relatedly, Canes-
Wrone (2006) develops a notion of “transformative leadership”: in the context of an agenda-
setting model, a leader (the President) strategically chooses whether to bring an issue to to
the public’s attention anticipating that (the pivotal) member of Congress will move toward the
public’s position. In our She must listen to others in order to reach more informed decisions.
We study verbal (cheap talk) communication between privately-informed participants who
provide advise to a leader anticipating that such advise may affect her decisions. Our in-
sights are developed within the context of multi-player communication between imperfectly
informed players as studied by Galeotti, Ghiglino, and Squintani (2013). There are numerous
applications of multi-player communication in the political science literature: Patty and Penn
(2013) study information transmission in small networks of decision makers; Patty (2013) de-
termines the optimal exclusion and inclusion policies to maximize information sharing among
cabinet members; Gailmard and Patty (2009) study transparency and optimal delegation by a
principal to informed agents; Dewan, Galeotti, Ghiglino, and Squintani (2011) investigate the
optimal assignment of decision-making power in the executive of a parliamentary democracy;
Penn (2014) studies the formation of stable aggregation of different units within an associa-
tion; Dewan and Squintani (2016) analyze the formation of party factions. Our contribution is
in developing the multi player communication model to deliver a large set of distinctive find-
ings on leadership and extending these in the context of party competition in which voters
anticipate (multi-player) communication within parties.
Several papers share our focus on characteristics that make a leader desirable.Dewan and
Myatt (2008); Warren (2012) contrast a leader’s judgement with her ability to communicate
8Within the context of a Keynsian beauty contest model, leaders are exogenous information sources that help
party activists to advocate the best policies and coordinate their actions.
8clearly. Bolton, Brunnermeier and Velkamp (2010) highlight the role of a leader’s “overcon-
fidence”. Egorov and Sonin (2010) focus on the tradeoff between competence and loyalty to
the leader. Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) show that democratically elected leaders are
more likely to have higher academic credentials than unelected ones. Relatedly, Galasso and
Nannicini (2011) view talented leaders as a scarce resource and analyze party allocation of
competent politicians, proxied by their education level, across electoral districts. We draw a
distinction between a leader’s judgement and her moderation. A key contribution here is in
studying leader characteristics that are derived from first principles.
As mentioned in our introductory notes, our model can be seen as one of implicit strategic
delegation initiated by Schelling (1960) to which recent more contributions include Harstad
(2010) and Chari, Jones, and Marimon (1997). The question we ask is when and why a polit-
ical leader would confer decision making authority to specialized or better informed bureau-
crats (see Huber and Shipan 2002, for a review). According to perceived wisdom, a political
principal would prefer delegating to a bureaucrat with views that are the most similar to
her own. The logic behind this so called ally principle has recently been challenged. Bendor
and Meirowitz (2004) identify a trade-off between a bureaucrats information and ideologi-
cal proximity as a reason for the its failure.9 Our work advances this insight in noting that
while politicians may delegate to bureaucrats with a mandate limited to policy implementa-
tion, they may also delegate the act of decision-making to other politicians due to the fact
that they are better informed. The failure of the ally principle that we identify– delegation
to an ideologically distant politician even in situations where this is detrimental to the group
as a whole–is based solely on observables (the ideologies of political actors) that initiated its
formulation.
Finally our model relates to a large literature on candidate valence defined as candidate’s
characteristics that benefit all voters regardless of their ideology. Many formal theoretical
models have analyzed the implication of valence on candidate policies and electoral outcomes
(Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000; Groseclose, 2001; Aragones and Palfrey, 2002; Callander
and Wilkie, 2007; Aragones and Palfrey, 2002; Bernhardt, Camara, and Squintani, 2011).
To our knowledge we provide the first derivation from first principles of electoral candidate’s
valence, in the form of good judgement. In the standard definition of valence, it is independent
of ideology. Here, in our microfoundation, a leadership candidate’s valence is related to, and
partly determined by, the ideological distribution of politicians in her group.
9The analysis of Bendor and Meirowitz (2004) explores a large number of features that may shape the form and
extent of delegation, including policy uncertainty, risk aversion by the political leader, costly information acqui-
sition by agents, ex-ante control, ex-post auditing, ex-post control, multiple political principals By and large, the
analysis shows that the ally principle and other assertions from the informal literature on delegation may or may
not hold, or hold only with important qualifications, depending on detailed game form or preference assumptions
that represent different institutions or instances of delegation. (See, also Epstein and Halloran, 1999, Gilligan
and Krehbiel, 1989, 1990, and Huber and McCarthy, 2004).
93. MODEL
This section sets out our basic model of leadership in a group of politicians who value informed
decisions, and hold ideological preferences. The distinctive feature of our model is that a
leader gathers advice from politicians before making her decision.
Our players are a group of politicians N = {1, ..., n} who are faced with a decision yˆ ∈ R.
One amongst them– a leader–makes the decision on the group’s behalf. The utility of each
politician i depends on how well yˆ matches an unknown state of the world θ. Politicians
are ideologically differentiated and so the utility of i depends also on her ideological bias bi.
Bringing these elements together in a familiar quadratic loss form, we suppose that, were she
to know θ, politician i’s payoff ui (yˆ, θ) would be a function of y according to:
ui (yˆ, θ) = − (yˆ − θ − bi)2 .
With this specification each politician i’s ideal policy is θ + bi: she would like the policy im-
plemented to be related to the state while accounting for her idiosyncratic bias. We assume
without loss of generality, that b1 ≤ b2 ≤ ... ≤ bn. The vector of ideologies b = {b1, ..., bn} is
common knowledge. The unknown state θ is uniformly distributed on [0, 1] .
Each politician i has some private information on θ. Specifically, conditional on θ, i holds
a signal si, which takes the value one with probability θ and zero with probability 1 − θ.
Politicians can communicate these signals to the leader before the decision is taken. A player’s
willingness to provide truthful advice may depend on who among them is selected as the
leader. For example, a player i may be unwilling to truthfully reveal a signal si = 1 if her
ideology bi is to the left of the group leader’s ideology. Supposing that player j is selected
as the leader, we say that each politician i may send a message mˆij ∈ {0, 1} to her. A pure
communication strategy of player i is thus a function mi that depends on both si and j.
Communication between politicians allows information to be transferred: adopting the stan-
dard terminology, and up to relabelling of messages, we say that each communication strategy
from i to j may be either truthful, so that mij(si) = si for si ∈ {0, 1}; or, alternatively, it may
be “babbling”, and in this case mij(si) does not depend on si. We interpret the politicians who
adopt the truthful strategy with respect to j as the trustworthy associates of that leader.10
After communication takes place, the leader chooses y so as to implement her preferred policy.
We denote a decision strategy by leader j as yj : {0, 1}N → R. Given the received messages
mˆ−j , by sequential rationality, j chooses yˆj to maximize her expected utility. So given the
quadratic loss specification of players’ payoffs, she chooses:
yj(sj , mˆj,−j) = bj + E[θ|sj , mˆ−j,j ]. (1)
10Individuals adopting the babbling strategy with a leader j can be interpreted as “yes-men”, who always give the
same advice to the leader, regardless of their information.
10
For a given leader j, an equilibrium consists of the strategy pair (m,y) and a set of beliefs
that are consistent with equilibrium play. Our equilibrium concept is pure-strategy Perfect
Bayesian Equilibrium. Fixing the leader, there may be multiple equilibria (m,y). For exam-
ple, the strategy profile where all players “babble” (their message is not informative of their
signal) is always an equilibrium. Because of equilibrium multiplicity, the ranking of leaders
and the leadership selection depend upon the choice of equilibrium: for the same leader j,
different equilibria yield different player payoffs. To avoid ambiguities, we assume that for
a given leader j, politicians coordinate on the equilibria (m,y) that provides the highest ex-
pected payoffs to all politicians.11 The selection of these equilibria is standard in games of
communication and allows us to focus attention on leadership selection.12
We consider two forms of leader selection.
The first one addresses our normative question: which leader would maximize politicians’
welfare if chosen? Following the utilitarian principle, we define welfare as the sum of players’
expected payoffs. Formally, define the optimal leader as player j who induces equilibria (m,y)
with the largest sum of expected payoffs:
W (m,y; j) = −
∑
i∈N
E[(yj − θ − bi)2].
We denote W ∗(j) as the maximal payoffs associated with selection of the optimal leader.
The second determines which player will be elected by majority rule. Player i’s payoff when j
is chosen as leader solves
Ui(m,y; j) = −E[(yj − θ − bi)2].
Once again, this is associated with the equilibrium (m,y) that provides the highest expected
payoff among the equilibria induced by j: we denote it as U∗i (j). The Condorcet winner is the
player j who defeats any other player k in a direct vote among alternatives j and k. As this
winner need not be well defined when n is even, (then, the majority vote may result in a tie),
we restrict attention to groups with an odd number of politicians.
4. A LEADER’S TRUSTWORTHY ASSOCIATES
In our model a leader is informed via communication from members of the group. This takes
the form of costless, or so-called “cheap talk”, messages. As no one member of the group is
perfectly informed, a politician becomes better informed the more other members truthfully
reveal their signals to her. Such politicians form her circle of trustworthy associates. We
first define and characterize this concept before calculating its size for an arbitrary leader j.
We show that the circle of trustworthy associates is related to key primitives of our model,
11Indeed, it can be easily shown that for any given leader j, each politicians’ ranking among the possible equilibria
(m,y) is the same (see Galeotti, Ghiglino, and Squintani (2013), Theorem 2).
12Extensions could consider equilibria in which a politician threatens to babble (thus not transmit information to
the elected leader) as a way to force her own election as leader.
11
namely the ordering of ideological biases within the group. Therefore we can relate a leader’s
judgement to the same ordering.
4.1. A Leader’s Judgement. The equilibrium communication structure given any chosen
leader j is easily derived, following Corollary 1 by Galeotti, Ghiglino, and Squintani (2013).
We let dj(m) be the number of politicians willing to truthfully advise j were she to lead the
group. These politicians form the group of trustworthy associates of j. We prove (in the
Appendix) that the profile m is an equilibrium if and only if, whenever i is truthful to j,
|bi − bj | ≤ 1
2 [dj(m) + 3]
. (2)
An important consequence of the equilibrium condition (2) is that truthful communication
from politician i to leader j becomes less likely with an increase in the difference between
their ideological positions.13 We use this result to derive how informed politician j would be
in the event where she becomes leader.
First we note that the term dj(m) is a function of the communication strategies deployed by
group members. In particular, whenever i can be truthful to j in equilibrium, then there is
another equilibrium in which i “babbles” when communicating with j: since she babbles j will
ignore her, and given this response there exists no profitable deviation for i. It proves useful
then to define d∗j as the maximal dj(m). That is, the most information that j could obtain
under the assumption that any politician who could communicate truthfully will in fact do
so. This allows us to define d∗j as the maximal size of the group of politician who form j’s
trustworthy associates. Straightforwardly, we can relate the maximal size of this group to a
leader’s equilibrium judgement.
Next we derive this leadership characteristic from first principles. In particular we can define
it as a consequence of j’s ideological position relative to that of other politicians in her party.
To do so we define the function Nj : R → N as the ideological “neighbourhood” function of
politician j. For any real number b, the quantity Nj (b) is the number of politicians whose
ideology is within distance b of her own, i.e., the number of politicians whose ideology is in
j’s ideological neighbourhood of size b. To formally define the function Nj , we exploit the fact
that politicians are ordered according to their bias, so that
Nj (b) = max{i ∈ N : |bi − bj | ≤ b} −min{i ∈ N : |bi − bj | ≤ b},
13A perhaps more surprising effect is that the possibility for i to communicate truthfully with j decreases with
the information held by j in equilibrium. To see why communication from i to j is less likely to be truthful
when j is well informed in equilibrium, suppose that bi > bj , so that i’s ideology is to the right of j’s bliss point.
Suppose j is well informed and that politician i deviates from the truthful communication strategy –she reports
mˆij = 1 when si = 0–then she will induce a small shift of j’s action to the right. Such a small shift in j’s action
is always beneficial in expectation to i, as it brings j’s action closer to i’s (expected) bliss point. Hence, politician
i will be unable to communicate truthfully a signal si = 0. By contrast, when j has a small number of players
communicating with her, then i’s report mˆij = 1 moves j’s action significantly to the right, and possibly beyond i’s
bliss point. In this case, biasing rightwards j’s action may result in a loss for politician i and so she would prefer
to report truthfully- that is, she will not deviate from the truthful communication strategy.
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for any real number b. For example, if the group of players who are truthful to leader j = 5 is
{3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, then Nj(b) = 7− 3 = 4. We use the function Nj (·) combined with the equilibrium
condition (2) to calculate the maximal size of j’s network of trustworthy associates d∗j .
Proposition 1. For any politician j, the maximal equilibrium number of truthful associates
d∗j is the unique d ∈ N which solves the equation
Nj
(
1
2 (d+ 3)
)
= d. (3)
This result provides a simple rule to calculate d∗j by counting the number of politicians other
than j that are ideologically close to her. For example, suppose that bj = 0 and the three
politicians closest to j have bias distance less than 1/12 from bj , i.e. they have a bias in the
interval (−1/12, 1/12). These politicians would provide truthful advice to j were she to be
selected as leader. For j to have one more trustworthy associate it must be that no member of
that circle has a bias further from bj = 0 than 1/14. Interestingly, the size of the ideological
neighborhood of leader j (to which a politician needs to belong to be trustworthy to j) decreases
in the number of associates truthful to j. For example, a politician i with bias bi of distance
within 1/10 and 1/8 to bj will be truthful to j if and only if j has no other trustworthy associate.
5. SELECTING THE LEADER
Having defined the size of a leader’s network of trustworthy associates, we now turn to the
question of leadership selection. We define the optimal leader as one who maximizes group
welfare. In the absence of a mechanism that ensures the first best choice, it is natural to
ask which leader would be chosen by the group when each casts a vote with the outcome
determined by majority rule. Using the result of the previous section we show that the char-
acteristics of optimal and majority-preferred leadership can be derived from first principles.
5.1. The Optimal Leader. We first show that optimal leader selection involves trading off
a politician’s ideological moderation and her judgement. To formalize this insight, we denote
politician j’s moderation as
∣∣bj −∑i∈N bi/n∣∣ , the distance between bj and the average ideol-
ogy
∑
i∈N bi/n. We have defined d
∗
j as the maximal size of a leader’s network of trustworthy
associates. It is but a small step to relate this number to her judgement, the second critical
and endogenous leadership characteristic. When combining the information obtained from
others with her own view, a leader forms an independent judgement of the best course of ac-
tion. Thus a leader’s judgement is (strictly) increasing in the number of informative signals
she obtains from her trustworthy associates.
In fact, and armed with these definitions, we can prove that the equilibrium ex-ante sum of
players’ payoffs W ∗ (j) can be rewritten as:
W ∗ (j) = −
∑
i∈N
(bi − bj)2 − n 1
6(d∗j + 3)
. (4)
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Expression (4) decomposes the welfare function into two elements: the aggregate ideological
loss
∑
i∈N (bi−bj)2 associated with the decision taken by j, and the aggregate residual variance
of her decision n[6(d∗j+3)]
−1. Evidently, a more moderate leader, whose bias is closer to average
ideology
∑
i∈N bi/n, makes the aggregate ideological loss
∑
i∈N (bi − bj)2 smaller. Further, the
residual variance [6(d∗j+3)]
−1 is inversely related to the size of the leader’s maximal informant
set d∗j and hence to her judgement.
14 Thus, optimal leader selection takes into account each
politicians’ moderation and her endogenous judgement that are related to the core primitives
of our model, namely the ideologies of members of the group.
Leader j’s moderation can be understood spatially as the relative position of j’s bias bj with
respect to the whole ideology distribution b = {b1, ..., bn} in the group. In fact, every element
of b, even extreme ones, matters for the determination of the average ideology
∑
i∈N bi/n. In
this sense, moderation is a “global” property of j’s ideology bj with respect to the distribution
b = {b1, ..., bn}.
On the other hand, judgement is a “local” property of j’s ideology bj within b = {b1, ..., bn}: it
depends only on how many other politicians are ideologically close to j, in the sense defined
by equation (2). The leader’s understanding is thus defined by those close to her, or adopting
Machiavelli’s text, by “the men she has around her”. This analysis of the role played by the
local ideological distribution is, to our knowledge, novel in the large contemporary and for-
mal literature on collective choice; though it echoes the insights of Machiavelli made in his
masterpiece of 500 years ago.
We summarize our findings as follows.
Proposition 2. A good leader j maximizes W ∗ (j). Hence, optimal leadership requires ideo-
logical moderation: leader j’s policy should reflect the diversity of views in the group. Optimal
leadership also requires judgement. This stems from the information that leader j obtains
from the politicians she has around her: the close-minded associates defined in proposition 1.
5.2. Electing the Leader. We now determine which politician is elected as leader by a sim-
ple majority decision taken within the group. Each player i’s utility as a function of the
leader’s identity j is:
Ui(j) = −(bi − bj)2 − 1
6(d∗j + 3)
. (5)
As in equation 4, the first term on the right hand side illustrates the ideological loss −(bi−bj)2
suffered by each member of the group iwhen j is chosen as leader. The second term illustrates
player i’s preference for an informed leader j, as it increases in the judgement d∗j . We note
that player utilities are not single-peaked with respect to a leader’s identity: a politician who
is ideologically distant may in fact be better informed, and so have better judgement, than
one who is ideologically similar. While Black’s theorem does not apply in this setting, so
14Mathematically, the residual variance [6(d∗j + 3)]−1 corresponds to the inverse of the precision of the leader’s
decision.
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leadership choice under majority rule is far from straightforward, we can, nevertheless, make
progress by establishing the weaker result that utility functions are single-crossing.
Lemma 1. The utility functions Ui (j) are single crossing in i and j: if i < j and i′ < i′′ then
Uj(i
′) > Uj(i′′)⇒ Ui(i′) > Ui(i′′); and if i > j and i′′ > i′ then Uj(i′′) > Uj(i′)⇒ Ui(i′′) > Ui(i′).
As a consequence of this result, we appeal to that by Gans and Smart (1996) to show that the
player with median ideology will determine the outcome of the election. The unique Condorcet
winner of the election game is the politician j who maximizes the expected payoff of the
median player.
Proposition 3. The group I elects as leader the player j who maximizes the utility U∗m(j) of
the median politician m = (n+1)/2. The collective choice considers the ideological proximity of
any player j to m, as well as j’s judgement that is determined by her number of close-minded
associates.
Having established the outcome of a majority election, we can compare it with the optimal
leader selection by inspecting expressions (4) and (5), the latter for i = m. As in the earlier
case there is a trade-off between moderation and judgement: the Condorcet winner j keeps
both the ideological loss (bm − bj)2 and the residual variance 16(d∗j+3) as low as possible. Just
as with optimal leadership, the majority choice involves a trade off between the desire for a
moderate leader and that for a leader with good judgement which, in turn, stems from having
a large group of close-minded associates. Beyond this similarity there is a critical difference
and it is this: whereas a majority preferred leader makes this trade off by considering only
her own payoff, by contrast, an optimally selected leader would consider the preferences of the
entire group. Straightforwardly, and as the weights placed on these two features of good lead-
ership are different in our key expressions, the majority choice of leader may not be optimal.
As we shall see, the implications are surprising in that we identify instances in which the
median politician’s utility U∗(·) places less weight on moderation (and more on judgement)
than the group’s welfare W ∗(·). Thus majority choice may be inefficient because it places too
much weight on the leader’s judgement.
6. WHAT MAKES A GOOD LEADER?
Our analysis relates the characteristics that define good leadership -moderation and judgement-
to the communication structure that emerges in the equilibrium of our model. The importance
of the former is well known. Indeed it is easy to see that if there were no informative signals
(or just no communication) in this game, then the chosen leader would be the median politi-
cian m = (n+ 1) /2, while the optimal one would be the one whose bias is the closest to the
average bias
∑n
i=1 bi/n. On the other hand, the role played by judgement, that in turn is
related to a leader’s trustworthy associates, is novel and central to the results that follow.
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6.1. Moderate Leadership. A natural question to ask our model is thus under which condi-
tions on the primitive parameters (the ideology distribution b), is the most moderate politician
the optimal leader and the majority-preferred one. Evidently, this is the case when there are
only 3 politicians in the group. For then the median is the most moderate politician and she
cannot be less informed than either of the others: If she is willing to communicate truthfully
with her neighbors, then at least one of them is willing to be truthful to her.15
Moving beyond the three-player case, we illustrate sufficient conditions such that the optimal
leader is also the most moderate politician. Doing so, we consider the situation in which
politicians are distributed at even distances with respect to their ideology on the line. Because
n is odd, and by symmetry of the ideological distribution, the median m = (n+1)/2 is the most
moderate and has at least as many trustworthy advisers as any other politician. Then there
is no tradeoff between a leader’s moderation and her judgement. As the median politician is
as informed as anyone else she should take the decision on behalf of the group and, indeed,
she would be the unique choice of the majority.
We formalize this insight in the following proposition that proves a stronger result. We show
that the median politician m is elected by the majority as leader and is also the optimal leader
when the ideology distribution is symmetric around m and ‘single peaked’ at m, in the sense
that politicians are more ideologically clustered as they get closer to m. Formally, we define
the ideology distribution b as ‘single peaked’ and symmetric at m when for any i = 1, ..m− 1,
bi+1 − bi weakly increases in i, and bi+1 − bi = bn−i+1 − bn−i.16
Proposition 4. When politicians’ ideologies b are single peaked and symmetric at m, the
median politician m is also maximally competent. she is the optimal leader, and will always
be elected as leader by majority.
The result is depicted in Figure 1 for n = 5 and ordered left-right biases b1 to b5. In the figure,
for each of three politicians b2, b3, and b4, their maximal amount of equilibrium information is
d∗j = 2. Then the optimal leader, and the one who is indeed chosen by the group, is player 3.
Proposition 4 relates the core characteristics of leadership to reveal that, with single-peaked
and symmetric biases (as in the case of equidistant biases depicted in Figure 1.) the most
moderate politician is also (weakly) the better informed and so has better judgement. The
15This reasoning can be pushed one step further. The most extreme politicians 1 and n can never be chosen as
leaders, as they do not have better judgement than their more moderate neighbors. Simply put: if a player i > 1
is willing to communicate truthfully to 1 in equilibrium, then also 1 is willing to communicate truthfully to i, and
i can count on left neighbors k < i who may be willing to communicate to her, whereas 1 does not have any left
neighbors available.
16Evidently, the case in which politicians’ ideologies are evenly distributed on the line, so that there is a constant
β > 0 such that bi+1 − bi = β for all i = 1, ..., n − 1, is a limit case covered by the definition of b as single peaked
and symmetric at m.
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b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
FIGURE 1. Leadership Choice with Equidistant Bias: this figure depicts the case
where bi − bi−1 = β for all politicians i = 2, ..5 and 1/12 < β ≤ 1/10. An arrow linking
two politicians illustrates that truthful communication is sustained between them.
significance of our result lies in the fact that, when ideologies in the group are evenly dis-
tributed, there is no tradeoff between moderation and the capacity to gather reliable advice.
This underlines that a necessary condition for a politician who is not the most moderate to be
the optimal leader or the elected one is that ideologies are not evenly distributed, but instead
are clustered in a nonhomogenous way.17 We explore this tradeoff next, focussing on the case
of 5 politicians for ease of exposition.
6.2. The Case with 5 Politicians. To explore the tradeoff between moderation and judge-
ment we study in-depth the case of 5 politicians, where, without loss of generality, we denote
the ideologies as b1 = −(α+β), b2 = −β, b3 = 0, b4 = γ, b5 = γ+ δ. Our case is suitably rich (al-
lowing us to identify properties of the ideology distribution that provide novel and interesting
findings) yet simple (so that we can do so in a clean and clear manner).
First we note that it can never be optimal that 1 and 5 lead the group and neither will they
be elected by the group as leaders. Players 2 and 4 can be chosen as leaders if and only if they
have better judgement than player 3. Also, interchanging α with δ and β with γ then players
2 and 4 are symmetric to each other. Hence, it is with no loss of generality that we restrict
attention to parameter values for which W ∗(2) ≥ W ∗(4), so that welfare is strictly greater
when 2 is the leader rather than 4, and for which U∗3 (2) ≥ U∗3 (4), so that the only possible
Condorcet winners are 2 and 3.
Player 2 has better judgement than 3 when she can count on more trustworthy associates,
that is when d∗2 > d∗3. Using equation (3), we calculate (in the appendix) all cases for which
the condition d∗2 > d∗3 holds, and determine the restriction each one of them imposes on the pa-
rameters α, β,γ and δ. Here, we illustrate our findings in the case in which d∗2 = 2 and d∗3 = 1.
This holds when α ≤ 1/10, β ≤ 1/10 but γ > 1/10. In this case, players 1 and 3 are sufficiently
close to 2 to be trustworthy, whereas the median politician 3 can trust only 2, but not 4. So
politician 2 has better judgement, while 3 is more moderate. This scenario is illustrated in
Figure 2 where γ is such that (in contrast to Figure 1) player 4 can no longer communicate
truthfully with 3. As the player ideologies are not distributed at even distances there may
17One example of such ideological clusters has been documented in Argentina. Politicians and policy experts
come from two separate ‘schools. One is the traditional Peronist or leftist ‘Intelligentsia,’ mainly composed of
social scientists and administrators that are entrenched in the Argentinian tradition. The second school are
the ‘Chicago/Minnesota boys,’ economists trained in ‘fresh water’ US PhD programs. Similar ideological clusters
appear in countries such as France.
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b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
FIGURE 2. Leadership Choice with Non-equidistant Bias: illustrates a case where
b1 = −(α+ β), b2 = −β, b3 = 0, b4 = γ and b5 = β + γ. An arrow linking two politicians
illustrates that truthful communication is sustained between them. Here α ≤ 1/10, β ≤
1/10 and δ ≤ 1/10 < γ. So each player is informed by her immediate neighbours.
be a tradeoff between judgement and moderation and, moreover, surprising consequences of
ideological shifts (such as that of player 4 in Figure 2 relative to Figure 1) which we discuss
below.
6.3. The Tradeoff between Judgement and Moderation. Whether the choice between
the more moderate politician 3 and politician 2, who has better judgment, is resolved in favor
of either depends upon β. This determines how extreme is 2 relative to 3. In fact, we can
relate the choice between politician 2 and 3 according to the size of β relative to the other
primitives of the model as demonstrated by the following result:
Lemma 2. Consider the case of 5 politicians, with the above restrictions: W ∗(2) ≥ W ∗(4),
U∗3 (2) ≥ U∗3 (4), α ≤ 1/10, β ≤ 1/10 and γ > 1/10.
• If β <
√
30
60 , then the Condorcet winner is politician 2, else, the most moderate politician
3 wins the majority choice.
• Letting φ = δ − α + 2γ > 1/10, if β < τ(φ) ≡
√
6
12
√
24φ2 + 1− φ, then the optimal leader
is 2, and else it is 3.
• There is a unique φ¯ > 1/10 such that τ(φ) >
√
30
60 for all φ < φ¯ whereas τ(φ) <
√
30
60 for
all φ > φ¯.
The result defines a welfare threshold, τ(φ). The group is better off when player 2 takes the
decision if and only if β, the ideological distance between players 2 and 3, is below τ(φ) which,
in turn, depends upon the values of α, δ, and γ. Intuitively, it is optimal that 2 leads the group
when her better judgement, combined with the benefits to those the left of the spectrum (α)
are not outweighed by the ideological loss incurred by those to the right (γ + δ).
Lemma 2 also defines a majority threshold. This takes a simpler form as it depends only on
the median player. she may obtain a more informed outcome when 2 takes the decision and
this yields a constant addition to her utility. This comes at an ideological cost β. Thus the
group chooses 2 as leader if and only if β is below a threshold given by the constant
√
30
60 .
The final part of lemma 2 reveals that in equilibrium the welfare threshold τ(φ) can either
be larger or smaller than the majority threshold
√
30
60 depending on how large φ is. In the
former case, we can distinguish three possibilities on the basis of β: For small β, i.e., β <
√
30
60 ,
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the non-moderate politician 2 is both the Condorcet winner and the optimal leader; for large
β, specifically, β > τ(φ), the most moderate politician 3 is both the Condorcet winner and
the optimal leader; in the intermediate case
√
30
60 < β < τ(φ), the optimal leader is the most
informed politician 2, whereas the majority elects politician 3. This identifies an instance in
which majority voting leads to a moderate but inefficient choice of leader.
A perhaps more interesting and unexpected case arises when τ(φ) <
√
30
60 . Again, for small
β, the non-moderate politician 2 is both the Condorcet winner and the optimal leader, and
for large β it is politician 3. Now inefficiency arises in the intermediate case in which τ(φ) <
β <
√
30
60 . Although the optimal leader is the most moderate politician 3, the majority elects
instead a relatively extreme leader in politician 2.
The logic behind this result is simple. The median politician may trade off moderation and
competence in a way that differs from the optimal choices made by a social planner. Starting
from her ideal point, she may sacrifice a policy more in line with her bias for a more informed
outcome. In our 5 player example, she will indeed do so when b2 − b3 is sufficiently small and
d2 > d3. Choosing a leftist leader then benefits the median and of course leftist members of
the group. But it harms the right-wing members 4 and 5, who bear costs (b4−b2)2 and (b5−b2)2
respectively. Because the ideological loss function (bi−bj)2 is convex in the ideological distance
|bi − bj |, the leadership move from 3 to 2 is more harmful to rightwing politicians than it is
beneficial to the leftist ones. Then it may be the case that a social planner would force the
median politician to take the decision, if only she could.
6.4. Comparative Statics. Further analysis of the five-player case uncovers some interest-
ing comparative statics results: A player changing her ideology from right (left) to left (right)
can induce a shift in leadership in the opposite direction.18
To illustrate, consider a benchmark case with players ideologies evenly distributed apart and
where politicians 2, 3, and 4 can all count on the truthful advice of their ideological neighbors,
so that 1/10 < α = β = γ = δ ≤ 1/8. Then following Proposition 4, politician 3 is (strictly) most
moderate and has (weakly) better judgement among the five; hence she is elected as leader
and this choice is also optimal for the group. Suppose now that the ideology of the centre-
right player 4 moves rightward and so away from that of the median player and that, as a
consequence, they are no longer truthful to one another (i.e., suppose that γ increases so as
to become larger than 1/8). Now politician 3 has lost a (previously) trustworthy associate. It
is now possible that the centre-left politician 2 is the Condorcet winner of the election game–
3 will delegate authority to her, despite not being the most moderate politician. Indeed, by
Lemma 2, we know that this is the case when β <
√
30
60 . Hence, the ideological movement of
a player towards a more extreme position may induce a leadership change in the opposite
direction.
18Such non-monotonocities are of course ruled out in the optimal selection of the leader in the absence of commu-
nication; and, following on from comments above, neither can they occur in the absence of communication when
the leader is elected under the Condorcet procedure.
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Conversely, suppose that the 5 politicians are such that, in the benchmark case with evenly
distributed ideologies, there is no truthful communication across players, i.e., α = β = γ =
δ > 1/8. Suppose now that the leftist politicians 1 and 2 become more moderate, so that
now politician 2 can count on the truthful advice of players 1 and 3 (formally, suppose that
α and β decrease, so that they both become smaller than 1/8). Because player 4 is still not
truthful to 3, leadership switches from the median player 3 to the centre-right player 2, again,
when β <
√
30
60 . Here, the rightward ideological movement of leftist players moves leadership
choice (and hence policy outcomes) in the opposite direction. Thus moderation allows them to
capture control of leadership of the group.
In both cases, and unexpectedly, a change in the ideological distribution by which politicians
(weakly) move right leads to a shift in the group decision to the left.
We summarize our findings for this section in the following result.
Proposition 5. When ideology is not evenly distributed on the line, a politician other than the
most moderate one can be the optimal leader and the majority choice.
Relative to the group of politicians, the median player weighs judgement more than moder-
ation: she may lead when it is in the groups interest that another with better judgement is
chosen; and she may not be chosen when it is optimal that she leads.
If politicians become more moderate (extremist), they capture (lose) control of the group, and
turn the group policy closer to (away from) their views.
6.5. Discussion. The findings of our positive study of leadership highlight the predictive
importance of judgement. The fact that the majority choice may place too much weight on
this characteristic is perhaps surprising, the more so when interpreting the decisive median
vote in the election as a decision to delegate authority to leaders with specific characteristics.
This notion goes back to Schelling (1960) who in his seminal book The Strategy of Conflict,
discussed the use of delegates with particular characteristics as a way to credibly commit
a negotiating party to a position. He suggested that agents in bargaining situations may
transfer power to stubborn negotiators.19 Seen in this context, we note that our model is
one where the median player can choose either to take the decision herself or delegate to
another politician. She chooses the latter option when another member of the group has more
information and so better judgement. The surprising, and we believe novel, finding is that
the median may delegate to another when it is in the groups interest that she execute the
decision herself.
As noted in our earlier discussion of related literature, when viewing our model as one of im-
plicit delegation, proposition 5 reveals a failure of the famous “ally principle”. This principle
states that the principal will always delegate to an agent who is ideologically closest to her.
19By contrast Chari, Jones, and Marimon (????) suggest that the opposite occurs in voting contexts.Harstad (2010)
draws a distinction between the political power of extreme politicians and the bargaining power of more moderate
ones, and analyzes the trade off between them.
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Indeed it has been noted that when viewing the set of possible principles and agents as a het-
erogenous groups rather than as unitary actors, and when agents are imperfectly informed,
then the ally principle may not hold. Our model combines these elements–multiple players
with different preferences–and reveals conditions on the primitives of our model under which
the ally principle holds and those where it does not and, moreover, provides a framework
within which to understand the welfare consequences of the failure of the ally principle.
Beyond this normative perspective, our analysis has consequences for the empirical analysis
of a number of institutional settings operating under majoritarian principles, where, following
Black, the decisive player is the median. We mention two possible applications of our ideas.
A large body of literature has explored the process of nominations and appointments to majori-
tarian institutions. For example Shepsle and Rohde and Krehbiel have analysed the process
by which nominations are made to the Supreme Court by an ideologically disposed President
and majority approved (or not) by a senate, in which senators anticipate the consequences of
such an appointment on court decisions that are likewise made under majority rule. As the
situation involves multiple inter-dependant institutions, as well as multi-player interactions
with each of these institutions, the set of possible strategies to consider is large. These mod-
els are tractable, however, due to the assumption that within the Senate and the Court the
pivotal player (politician, judge) is the one with the median preference. Appointments can
then be considered with respect to whether or not they change the identity of that player, and,
hence, these models go by the description of “move the median” games. Our analysis suggests,
by contrast, that it is not just the identity of the median that is important in determining a
groups choice under majority rule. This implies that the results of the “move the median”
game may be different when considering preferences that depend on private information.
A second and related research topic is the writing of the Supreme Court decision. The exact
procedure is elaborate, but again things simplify if one assumes that the opinion is either
directly written by the median justice (referred to as the median justice model) or must be
approved by her as part of a bargaining process. As noted by Clark (2012) , “the former case
is essentially an application of the median voter theorem to the supreme court,” as it rests
on, “the assumption that an opinion must gain the assent of four justices, the median justice
and four justices on one side or another.” A straightforward extension of our five player group,
depicted in Figure 2, to a nine member Court would yield different insights. Specifically, our
analysis suggests that the opinion of a justice other then the median may achieve majority
support. As already noted in our introductory remarks, in her review of the field, Clarke
suggests that relaxing the complete information assumption in standard models may yield
new insights. Indeed our analysis would appear to confirm that this is in fact the case.
We postpone a more extensive application of our ideas to these cases to future research. Here,
instead, we focus attention on an immediate and we believe first order extension of our model.
As already noted, our analysis of group choice of leader provides insights that differ from those
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provided by a straightforward application of Black’s Theorem. A noted application of Blacks
ideas is via the workhorse spatial model of party competition. We study a version of that
model with two parties who each choose a leader who then competes in a general election.
7. A MODEL WITH ELECTORAL COMPETITION
The analysis in the previous section reveals that a relatively extreme leader may be chosen
if she has good judgement. Also, it highlighted a peculiar non-monotonic comparative static
result: a rightward shift by a politician can induce a leftist choice of leader, and vice-versa.
Next we explore whether these surprising effects survive political competition. Will politi-
cal groups such as parties choose relatively extreme leaders when their candidates face an
electoral test in the form of a general election?
In order to explore this, we analyze a model of two party competition that incorporates dif-
ferent democratic selection methods. We consider a world where each party first chooses an
electoral candidate (who we identify as the party leader, although this is not needed for our
arguments) via an internal election involving politicians, members, and/or registered votes.
Party leaders then compete in a general election. As in the now standard citizen candidate
model of Osborne and Slivinski (1996) and Besley and Coate (1997), the winner of the election
implements her ideal policy. The difference (with the standard model) is that she does so only
after consultation with other informed politicians in her own party. We assume that politi-
cians and the electorate as a whole value informed decisions made by elected office holders,
but are ideologically differentiated and anticipate final outcomes when casting their votes.
7.1. Model. Suppose that there are two parties, A and B. The leading politicians in party
A consist of the set of politicians NA = {1, ..., q} and those in B consist of politicians N =
{q+ 1, ..., n}. At the beginning of the game, parties chooses leaders {a, b}. To make our results
general, we do not commit to a specific leader choice model. We assume only that each party
selects as leader the strongest possible candidate, defined as the politician within the party
who defeats the largest possible number of candidates from the other party in the general
election. To simplify the exposition, we consider only ideology and party profiles such that
there is only one such politician in each party.20 The eventual winner j ∈ {a, b} of the general
election then implements the final policy yˆ ∈ R. Following the citizen-candidate paradigm,
candidates cannot credibly commit to their electoral promises and so will implement their
preferred policy if elected. Unlike in basic citizen-candidate models, the winner of the election
makes her decision only after consultation with her party leading politicians.
20These assumptions are very weak and would be satisfied in a number of micro-founded models of leader selection
within our framework. For example, it may be that only the leading politicians in the party have real influence on
party leadership. Another possibility is to say that each politician in either party can participate in a primary, held
under plurality rule and at a small cost c > 0 to herself, to become the leader of the party. These primaries yield
leaders who obtain (small) ego rents, r > c, and only citizens registered with the party can vote in the primaries.
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There are a continuum of citizens, which includes the finite set of politicians NA ∪ NB. The
preferences of each citizen k, including politicians, are expressed by:
uk (yˆ, θ) = − (yˆ − θ − bk)2 ,
where bk is the ideological bias of citizen k relative to the median voter in the general election,
who we assume to have bias equal to zero, without loss of generality. As before, the utility of k
depends on how well yˆ matches an unknown state of the world θ together with her ideological
bias bk. We single out politicians who belong to the set NA ∪NB, denote them with indexes i,
and maintain the assumption that bi is increasing in i and therefore that all politicians in A
are to the left of all politicians in B.
The remainder of our model is as before. Each politician i has some private information
on θ. After the general election takes place, each i observes a signal si ∈ {0, 1} of θ such
that Pr (si = 1|θ) = θ. And before the elected policy-maker j chooses yˆ, each politician i can
communicate by sending a message mˆij ∈ {0, 1} to j. We assume that the elected politician
has truthful associates only within her own party, and so restrict attention to equilibria in
which the politicians from the opposite party do not reveal any information to her.
As in the previous section, each voter evaluates a candidate j on the basis of both j’s ideolog-
ical proximity (bi − bj)2 and her judgment, identified by the number of j’s trustworthy party
fellows d∗j , according to the, by now usual, decomposition:
U∗i (j) = −(bi − bj)2 −
1
6(d∗j + 3)
.
Because each voter i evaluates a candidate j’s judgement favorably, regardless of her ideology,
we can think of judgment as valence. Here, it is endogenously determined by j’s network of
trustworthy party fellows.
As a consequence of Lemma 1, preferences satisfy the single crossing condition with respect
to the choice of leader in the general election. Moreover, the play of weakly undominated
strategies in (the subgame that represents) the election implies that each voter chooses her
preferred candidate j ∈ {a, b}. As a consequence, candidate a will be elected with certainty if
and only if U0(a) > U0(b), where we take 0 to be the index of the median voter.
7.2. Policy Divergence. A natural benchmark for comparison is an otherwise identical model
in which players are not allowed to communicate to the elected leader before she chooses the
policy yˆ. As no communication can take place, so no information about θ can be aggregated,
only the vector of ideologies b are relevant to votes cast in either primary or general election.
As these are common knowledge, the game then boils down to a simple one of perfect informa-
tion. It is then straightforward to prove that U0(a) > U0(b) only when the policy bias of leader
a is closer to 0 than that of b, so that the most moderate candidate in each party is chosen as
leader.
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b1 b2 b3 b4 b5 b6
FIGURE 3. Party Competition with Equidistant Bias: The figure illustrates a case
where politicians 1, 2, 3 belong to party A and 3, 4, 5 to party B. Within each party each
politician is informed by her immediate neighbour. Then for some parameter values
provided in the text, party A chooses candidate 2 and Party B chooses candidate 5 as
leader with each equally likely to win the general election.
Fact 1. Suppose that politicians cannot communicate to the politician j who wins the general
election. Then the winner of the general election is the player whose ideology is closest to that
of the median voter in the electorate.
Whenever politicians are sufficiently ideologically distant from each other that they can never
communicate truthfully (even to their closest ideological neighbour) then the winner of the
general election is the candidate with bias closest to zero. Beyond this simple case, it is
immediate that, in our model of electoral competition, party leaders need not be moderate.
The analysis follows our earlier logic: politicians with a large network of truthful informants
may be preferred by the median voter even if they have relatively extreme ideologies. In fact
we can reveal new insights. First we show that the winner of the general election need not
be the most moderate politician (i.e., the politician whose ideology is closest to the median
voter), even in circumstances in which the politicians’ ideologies are evenly distributed in the
ideological spectrum. Thus our finding stands in sharp contrast with Proposition 4. Why
so? When politicians are partitioned in competing parties the most moderate politician (with
respect to the electorate as a whole) is at the extreme end of the ideological spectrum within
her own party. This constrains the pool of trustworthy associates she can rely upon and so
hampers her ability to take informed decisions if elected to office.
Proposition 6. Even if the ideologies b of the potential candidates NA ∪ NB are evenly dis-
tributed, so that there exists β and that bi+1 − bi = β for all i = 1, ..., n − 1, it need not be the
case that the winner of election is one of the most moderate politicians.
This insight is demonstrated by the 6-player example depicted in figure 3. There are 6 politi-
cians, with ideologies such that bi+1− bi = β for all i = 1, ..., 5, arranged symmetrically around
the median ideology zero, so that b3 = −β/2 and b4 = β/2. The leftist politicians 1, 2, and 3
(lighter shading) belong to party A and the others (darker shading) to party B.
Following our earlier analysis, unless politicians 2 and 5 can count on more trustworthy advis-
ers than 3 and 4, in equilibrium, the latter will be elected in the primaries and tie the general
election. Because of the symmetry of b we can focus attention on the challenge between 2 and
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3 for leadership of party A. Politician 2 has better judgement when d∗2 = 2 and d∗3 = 1, which
requires that β ≤ 1/10 and that 2β > 1/10.
It is then relatively straightforward to identify a condition on β such that the median voter in
the general election would prefer that candidate 2 is chosen by party A, that is U0(2) > U0(3).
Specifically, we show in the appendix that this is the case when 1/20 < β <
√
15/60. By
symmetry, and since the median has zero bias, it must also be that U0(5) > U0(4). Hence, in
the unique equilibrium, party A chooses politician 2 as leader, and party B chooses politician
5. In sum, the chosen leaders are not the most moderate candidates 3 and 4.
This result provides a new take on the documented divergence among candidates in two party
elections. Even if two parties compete for power, they will not necessarily the most moderate
candidates, so that convergence to the median will not take place. This finding complements
earlier explanation for policy divergence that abstract from party competition (e.g., the citizen
candidate models by ? or ?, or the model by ? and ?).
7.3. Moderation and Party Cohesiveness. The second novel insight highlights the value
of a party’s ideological cohesiveness. Interpreting a party’s cohesiveness as the ideological
distance among its leading members, we find that a more cohesive party can defeat a larger,
less cohesive, one in a general election. This can occur even though the larger party can draw
information from a larger set of informed politicians. And it can occur even though the leader
of the larger party has views that are closer to those of the median voter. Why? The leader
of the more cohesive party can count on more trustworthy associates than her opponent. The
median voter anticipates that, as a consequence, she will have better judgement.
Finally, we find that the outcome of the election may depend on the whole ideological distri-
bution and often in a very subtle way. For example, suppose that a party leader becomes more
moderate then she may lose the general election as a result of her new found moderation. (Of
course, the opposite can happen: a politician may lose the election by becoming more extreme).
Intuitively, this occurs because, by becoming more moderate, the party leader increases the
ideological distance between herself and others in the party. And , as a consequence, she loses
the benefit of the truthful advise they would otherwise have provided her with. This result
is, to the best of our knowledge, both novel and unsupported by any variant of the standard
spatial model found in the literature.
Proposition 7. A large party may lose the election to a smaller, more cohesive party, even if it
can draw information from a larger number of leading members and though its leader is the
candidate in the general election whose views are closest to the median voters.
The outcome of the election may depend on the whole ideological distribution of leading politi-
cians a subtle way: For example, a party leader may moderate her views (closer to the median
voter), and lose the general election as a result.
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b1 b2 b3 b4 b5
FIGURE 4. Party Competition with a majoritarian party: illustrates a case where
politicians 1 and 2 are in party A and 3, 4, 5 are in party B;b1 = −(α + β), b2 = −β,
b3 = γ, b4 = γ + δ and b5 = γ + 2δ and γ < β. The figure depicts within party communi-
cation where arrows linking two politicians illustrates that truthful communication is
sustained between them. Here α ≤ 1/8 and δ > 1/8.
The result can be demonstrated by means of the following example, illustrated in figure 4.
Suppose that there are 5 politicians, with ideologies b1 = −(α+ β), b2 = −β, b3 = γ, b4 = γ + δ
and b5 = γ + 2δ with γ < β. Politicians 1 and 2 belong to party A and 3, 4, 5 belong to party
B. In this example, there are two senses in which party B is advantaged: there is a larger set
of leading politicians from whom the leader could draw upon for information; and in player
3, it has a potential leader whose views are closest to those of the median voter. In fact, the
mid-point between the ideological views of the most moderate politicians in parties A and B,
that is defined by M = (−β + γ)/2, is to the left of zero, the ideal point of the median voter.
This implies that, were there no possibility of communicating private information, party B
would always win the election by selecting politician 3 as its leader. Party B is not only larger,
it is also “ideologically majoritarian” in that, in contrast to party A, it is able to put forward
candidates whose ideological perspective appeals to a majority of the electorate.
Given the advantage of B in fielding more moderate candidates, following Lemma 1, a politi-
cian from party A can only be elected due to her better judgement. For this to be the case
it must be that d∗2 = 1 > d∗3 = 0, as there is only one other informed politician in party A.
This situation requires that α ≤ 1/8 whereas δ > 1/8, and is depicted in Figure 4. It is
then not difficult to find conditions under which the median voter prefers to politician 2 from
party A to any politician from party B, so that, in equilibrium, B will lose the election de-
spite its advantage. Specifically, we find in the appendix that this is the case if and only if
(β − γ)(β + γ) < 1/72: this condition is satisfied when the mid-point M = (−β + γ)/2 < 0 is
not too far from zero, the median voter’s ideal point.
To see that a leader can lose the election by moving closer to the median voter, consider
politician 2 as leader of party A. Suppose that we start from a situation in which α is close
to 1/8, candidate 2 is barely within range of 1 and so 1 is a trustworthy associate of 2. If
politician 2 moves ideologically closer to the median voter, and 1’s position remains fixed,
then the condition α ≤ 1/8 will no longer be satisfied. Thus candidate 2’s judgement is no
longer better than that of politician 3 and so, were they to contest the election, 2 would lose.21
21The claim that a candidate can lose the election by moving closer to the median voter can also be proved by
making γ larger and reducing δ so that b4 and b5 remain constant and b3 moves closer to b4 thereby making it
possible for the leader 3 to gather politician 4’s truthful advice.
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7.4. Discussion. Our results link the notion of cohesiveness to a party’s electoral success
and suggests that anything that increases (decreases) cohesion will have positive (negative)
electoral consequences22 These theoretical results are consistent with a common understand-
ing that ‘divided parties don’t win’ (Worcester, Mori Publications 2002) and empirical findings.
For example in the UK in three elections previous to Labours election victory in 1997, each
of which provided the Conservatives with a majority, Labour were the party perceived to be
the most divided. The British General Election Study of 1983 reveals that 24.2% of the elec-
torate perceived the Conservatives to be divided whereas 87.9% perceived Labour to be so. In
1987 the corresponding figures were 42.1% for the Conservatives and 66.9% for Labour, and
in 1992, 27.1% for the Conservatives and 62.8% for Labour. In 1997, however, more of the
electorate (40.6%) perceived the Conservatives to be divided than perceived Labour to be so
(18.9%) (Source, British General Election Studies, Heath, Jowell, Curtice et al 1983, 1987,
1992, 1997).
Our results on the importance of the cohesiveness of parties relate to debates on party size,
and how this affects their political viability and effectiveness, that dates back at least to
Michels (1911). Our model highlights that the size of party may be less important than the
ideological disparity of views within it. Indeed our results suggest that the formation of a
leadership clique or oligarchy that closed down the possibility of fruitful internal debate would
be damaging.23
Our results on the relevance of party cohesiveness and of the choice of a leader that is not
estranged from the party are especially relevant to understand the events that led to the
victory of Labour victory in the 1997 UK elections. That Labour victory is often related to
its leader Tony Blair’s moderation and his eschewing of the left-wing policies of predecessors.
Our result suggests a different narrative, namely that it was the ideological cohesion of “New
Labour” rather than the moderation of its leader that was important. Indeed, a corollary to
proposition 7 is that the moderation of its leader is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition
for party success. Instead, and in order to assess the chances of electoral victory, one should
consider the relationship between the party leader and those of his associates. In his memoirs
Blair talks about the team of politicians who advised him and on whom he could rely, amongst
them Gordon Brown, John Reid, and David Blunkett. Referring to the latter he states (page
34-35) “his loyalty and commitment to New Labour, I never doubted.” Yet whereas Blair
himself had always been a moderate and so natural moderniser, Blunkett had moved from
the left toward the center. He had been a leader of Sheffield Council, one of Britain’s most left
leaning councils during the 1980’s. His personal ideological change was noted in an article
by the Economist in 2001, which described him in the following terms: “a municipal socialist
when Thatcherism was rampant, he came to understand the limitations of the old left. This
made him a genuine Blairite.” Our analysis suggests that the ideological odyssey of Blunkett
22Party cohesiveness is studied in McGann (2002) and McGann, Koetzle, and Grofman (2002).
23Either there can no truthful communication between the leader and those outside his clique, and so it would not
matter, or (in the case where truthful communication were possible) it would be damaging.
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(amongst others) that allowed him to become a trustworthy associate of Blair, and that might
be seen as a small episode in Labour history, should be viewed as a central component of its
electoral success.24
8. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
Our paper develops a theory of leadership that focuses upon a leader’s relations with others in
the governance process and, in particular, the importance of her network of close friends and
allies. These are people the leader can rely upon to truthfully reveal any private information
they hold. A large network of such allies translates into better judgement and better policy. In
studying the endogenous formation of such networks we have been able to formulate a theory
of leadership choice in which a leaders core characteristic, her judgement or ability to ascer-
tain the best course of action, stems from first principles. Analysis of our model uncovers a set
of results that can plausibly explain documented facts, such as the election of extreme leaders
and the impact of ideological change within a collective body (such as a party or committee),
that are not easily reconciled with previous theories.
We conclude by discussing some useful extensions of our ideas. An interesting question is
how our results would change if different politicians had different access to information. It is
possible, for example, that ideologically close politicians gather information largely from the
same sources. As a result, the advice of associates who are too ideologically close may be less
valuable than that provided by more distant ones. Of course, our main result, that associates
who are too ideologically distant are not truthful to the leader in equilibrium, would survive
in a model in which information is possibly correlated among politicians. As a result, all
of our possibility results would extend to this enriched environment. Further, it may prove
interesting to determine the optimal composition of advisers to the leader. This subject is
the argument of our current research. We conjecture that the optimal set of advisors would
only include politicians whose ideological distance from the leader is neither too large nor too
small: ideologically distant advisers would not be consulted as their recommendations would
not be credible, and it is possible that politicians who are too close would be excluded so as not
to crowd out more valuable less ideologically close advisors (see discussion in footnote 13.)25
24Our lessons resonate with British politics today. At the time of writing the Conservative Party, under its new
leader Theresa May, enjoys a large lead over its Labour rivals. Both parties are divided, and have recently been
involved in bruising leadership contests. Yet within the Conservative Party, even bitter rivals such as Michael
Gove and Borris Johnson have, allegedly, agreed “to keep lines of communication open.” By contrast, lines of
communication between the Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn and her closest allies in the Parliamentary Labour
Party are frayed. Chris Bryant, one of several MPs who have called upon Mr Corbyn to quit states: Its a bit of
a problem if Jeremy wont even see the seven people in his shadow cabinet who he appointed this week.” In the
same passage, Bryant goes on to speak of the leader having developed a “bunker mentality”(Corbyn Has Bunker
Mentality Say Challengers, FT.com, July 3rd, 2016.)
25A distinct reason for why leaders may choose advisers with diverse policy preferences is that they may de-
cide to pitch advocates with opposite views to argue about the pros and cons of policy choices with uncertain
consequences. Policy makers would then rely on verifiable information disclosed by the advocates, and discard
unverifiable political advice. By selecting advocates with opposite views, the best incentives are provided for the
advocates to expend effort in investigating the matter and acquiring information. Instead, our paper focuses on
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1ONLINE APPENDIX NOT SUBMITTED FOR PUBLICATION
Equilibrium beliefs.
In our model a politicians’ equilibrium updating is based on the standard Beta-binomial
model. Suppose that a politician i holds n bits of information, i.e. she holds the private
signal si and n − 1 politicians truthfully reveal their signal to her. The probability that l out
of such n signals equal one, conditional on θ is
f (l|θ, n) = n!
l! (n− l)!θ
l (1− θ)(n−l) .
Hence, politician i’s posterior is
f (θ|l, n) = (n+ 1)!
l! (n− l)!θ
l (1− θ)(n−l) ,
the expected value is
E (θ|l, n) = l + 1
n+ 2
,
and the variance is
V (θ|l, n) = (l + 1) (n− l + 1)
(n+ 2)2 (n+ 3)
.

Derivation of Expression 2. Consider any player j, and let Cj(m) be the set of players
truthfully communicating with j in equilibrium. The equilibrium information of j is thus
dj(m) = #Cj(m) + 1, the cardinality of Cj(m) plus j’s signal. Consider any player i ∈ Cj(m).
Let sR be the vector containing sj and the (truthful) messages of all players in Cj(m) except
i. Let also yjsR,s be the action that j would take if she has information sR and believed in
the signal s sent from player i, analogously, yjsR,1−s is the action that j would take if she has
information sR and believed in the signal 1 − s sent from player i. Agent i reports truthfully
signal s to the leader j if and only if
−
∫ 1
0
∑
sR∈{0,1}dj(m)
[(
yjsR,s − θ − bi
)2 − (yjsR,1−s − θ − bi)2] f(θ, sR|s)dθ ≥ 0.
Using the identity a2 − b2 = (a− b)(a+ b) and simplifying, we obtain:
−
∫ 1
0
∑
sR∈{0,1}dj(m)
(
yjsR,s − yjsR,1−s
)[yjsR,s + yjsR,1−s
2
− (θ + bi)
]
f(θ, sR|s)dθ ≥ 0.
Next, observing that
yjsR,s = bj + E [θ|sR, s] ,
2we obtain
−
∫ 1
0
∑
sR∈{0,1}dj(m)
(E[θ + bj |sR, s]− E[θ + bj |sR, 1− s])
[
E[θ + bj |sR, s] + E[θ + bj |sR, 1− s]
2
− (θ + bi)
]
f(θ, sR|s)dθ ≥ 0.
Denote
∆ (sR, s) = E [θ|sR, s]− E [θ|sR, 1− s] .
Observing that:
f(θ, sR|s) = f(θ|sR, s) Pr(sR|s),
and simplifying, we get:
−
∑
sR∈{0,1}dj(m)
∫ 1
0
∆ (sR, s)
(
E [θ|sR, s] + E [θ|sR, 1− s]
2
+ bj − bi − θ
)
f(θ|sR, s)dθPr(sR|s) ≥ 0.
Furthermore, ∫ 1
0
θf(θ|sR, s)dθ = E[θ|sR, s],
and ∫ 1
0
f(θ|sR, s)E[θ|sR, s]dθ = E[θ|sR, s],
because E[θ|sR, s] does not depend on θ. Therefore, we obtain:
−
∑
sR∈{0,1}dj(m)
[
∆ (sR, s)
(
E [θ|sR, s] + E [θ|sR, 1− s]
2
+ bj − bi − E [θ|sR, s]
)]
P (sR|s)
= −
∑
sR∈{0,1}dj(m)
[
∆ (sR, s)
(
−E [θ|sR, s]− E [θ|sR, 1− s]
2
+ bj − bi
)]
P (sR|s) ≥ 0.
Now, note that:
∆ (sR, s) = E[θ|sR, s]− E[θ|sR, 1− s]
= E [θ|l + s, dj(m) + 1]− E [θ|l + 1− s, dj(m) + 1]
= (l + 1 + s) / (dj(m) + 3)− (l + 2− s) / (dj(m) + 3)
=
{
−1/ (dj(m) + 3) if s = 0
1/ (dj(m) + 3) if s = 1.
where l is the number of digits equal to one in sR. Hence, we obtain that agent i is willing to
communicate to agent j the signal s = 0 if and only if:
−
( −1
dj(m) + 3
)(
− −1
2(dj(m) + 3)
+ bj − bi
)
≥ 0,
or
bj − bi
dj(m) + 3
≥ − 1
2 (dj(m) + 3)
2 ,
3and note that this condition is redundant if bj − bi > 0. On the other hand, she is willing to
communicate to agent j the signal s = 1 if and only if:
−
(
1
dj(m) + 3
)(
− 1
2(dj(m) + 3)
+ bj − bi
)
≥ 0,
or
bj − bi
dj(m) + 3
≤ 1
2 (dj(m) + 3)
2 ,
and note that this condition is redundant if bj − bi < 0. Collecting the two conditions yields:
|bj − bi| ≤ 1
2 (dj(m) + 3)
,
i.e., expression (2). 
Proof of Proposition ??. Because Nj (·) is an increasing step function, and 1/ [2(d+ 2)]
strictly decreases in d, whereas the identity function is strictly increasing in d, there is a
unique solution to equation (3). From equilibrium condition 4, we see that maximization
of W (m,y) is equivalent to maximization of the equilibrium information dj (m) . Inspection
of the equilibrium condition 2 shows that the maximal information of the leader j can be
calculated according to equation (3). 
Derivation of equilibrium welfare, expression 4. Assume (m,y) is an equilibrium. The
ex-ante expected utility of each player i is:
Eui(m,y) = −E
[
(yj − θ − bi)2; (m,y)
]
= −E [(bj + E [θ|Ωj ]− θ − bi)2;m]
where Ωj denotes the equilibrium information of the leader j. Hence
Eui(m,y) = −E
[
(bj − bi)2 + (E [θ|Ωj ]− θ)2 − 2(bj − bi) (E [θ|Ωj ]− θ) ;m
]
= −
[
(bj − bi)2 + E
[
(E [θ|Ωj ]− θ)2 ;m
]
−2(bj − bi) (E[E [θ|Ωj ] ;m]− E[θ;m])] ,
by the law of iterated expectations, E[E [θ|Ωj ] ;m] = E[θ;m], and by definition
E
[
(E [θ|Ωj ]− θ)2 ;m
]
= σ2j (m).
Further, note that the equilibrium information Ωj of the leader may be represented as any
vector in {0, 1}dj(m)+1. Letting l be the number of digits equal to one in any such vector, we
obtain
E
[
(E [θ|Ωj ]− θ)2 ;m
]
=
∫ 1
0
dj(m)+1∑
l=0
(E [θ|l, dj(m) + 1]− θ)2 f(l|dj(m) + 1, θ)dθ
=
∫ 1
0
dj(m)+1∑
l=0
(E [θ|l, dj(m) + 1]− θ)2 f (θ|l, dj(m) + 1)
dj(m) + 1 + 1
dθ,
4where the second equality follows from f(l|dj(m) + 1, θ) = f(θ|l, dj(m) + 1)/(dj(m) + 2).
Because the variance of a beta distribution of parameters l and d+ 1, is
V (θ|l, d+ 1) = (l + 1) (d+ 1− l + 1)
(d+ 1 + 2)2 (d+ 1 + 3)
,
we obtain:
E
[
(E [θ|Ωj ]− θ)2 ;m
]
=
1
dj(m) + 2
dj(m)+1∑
l=0
V (θ|l, dj(m) + 1)

=
dj(m)+1∑
l=0
(l + 1) (dj(m)− l + 2)
(dj(m) + 2) (dj(m) + 3)
2 (da(k)(m) + 4)
=
1
6(dj(m) + 3)
.

Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that there is a constant β > 0 such that bi+1 − bi = β for
all i = 1, ..., n− 1. Then, for any real number b > 0, the size of ideological neighborhood Nj (b)
is constant in j for all players j such that the number of politicians i who belong to Nj (b)
and have biases bi to the left of bj is the same as the number of politicians i who belong to
Nj (b) and have biases bi to the right of bj . Formally, letting ı¯j (b) = max{i ∈ N : |bi − bj | ≤ b}
and ij (b) = min{i ∈ N : |bi − bj | ≤ b}, we have that Nj (b) = 2bb/βc + 1, for any j such that
ı¯j (b)− j = j − ij (b) , where the notation bb/βc denotes the largest integer smaller than b/β.
The remaining players j are constrained by the boundaries of the ideology spectrum b1 and bn
in the size of their ideological neighborhood Nj (b) , so that it is either the case that ı¯j = n, in
which caseNj (b) = bb/βc+1+ı¯j (b)−j, or that ij = 1, in which caseNj (b) = bb/βc+1+j−ij (b) ;
and in both cases Nj (b) < 2bb/βc+ 1.
Because m = (n + 1)/2, by construction Nm (b) = 2bb/βc + 1 for all values of b, and hence
Nm (b) ≥ Nj (b) for all other politician j and values of b. Note now that the equation (3) can be
written as:
φ (j, d) = Nj
(
1
2 (d+ 3)
)
− d = 0,
and that φ (j, d) decreases in d because Nj (b) weakly increases in b and 12(d+3) decreases in d.
Hence, the integer d which solves φ (j, d) = 0 is maximal for the index(es) j which maximize
the function Nj (·) . That is to say, when there is a constant β > 0 such that bi+1 − bi = β for
all i = 1, ..., n − 1, the median politician m weakly dominates all other politicians in terms of
competence, and should always be selected as group leader. 
Analysis of the 5 Player Case in Section 6, Proof of Lemma 2 and of Proposition 5.
We calculate all the parameter regions in which d∗3 > d∗2. d∗3 = 0 if β > 1/8 and γ > 1/8; so that
d∗2 ≤ 1 as 3 will never be truthful to 2. Specifically, d∗2 = 1 if α ≤ 1/8. d∗3 = 1 if β ≤ 1/8 and
5γ > 1/10; so that d∗2 ≤ 2 as 4 will never be truthful to 2. Specificall, d∗2 = 2 if α ≤ 1/10 and
β ≤ 1/10. d∗3 = 1 if β > 1/10 and γ ≤ 1/8; so that d∗2 ≤ 1 as 3 will never be truth ful to 2. d∗3 = 2
if β ≤ 1/10 and γ ≤ 1/10 but α + β > 1/12 and γ + δ > 1/12; so that d∗2 ≤ 3 as 5 will never
be truthful to 2. Specifically, d∗2 = 3 if β + γ ≤ 1/12 and α ≤ 1/12. d∗3 = 3 if α + β ≤ 1/12 and
γ ≤ 1/12 but γ + δ > 1/14; so that d∗2 ≤ 3 as 5 will never be truthful to 2. d∗3 = 3 if α+ β > 1/14
but β ≤ 1/12 and γ + δ ≤ 1/12; so that d∗2 ≤ 4. Specifically, d∗2 = 4 if β + γ + δ ≤ 1/16 and
α ≤ 1/16.
Using expression (4), we can calculate the aggregate expected payoffs for selecting either
politician 2 or 3 as the leader:
W ∗ (2) = −α2 − β2 − (β + γ)2 − (β + γ + δ)2 − 5 1
6 (2 + 3)
,
W ∗ (3) = − (α+ β)2 − β2 − γ2 − (γ + δ)2 − 5 1
6 (1 + 3)
.
The centre-left politician 3 is optimally selected as the leader whenever
W ∗ (2)−W ∗ (3) = 1− 24β
2 − 48βφ
24
> 0 or β < τ (φ) ≡
√
6
12
√
24φ2 + 1− φ
where φ = δ − α+ 2γ > 1/10. It is easy to verify that the threshold τ (φ) is strictly decreasing
in φ, with τ (1/10) ≈ 0.1273, that τ (φ) is strictly positive for any φ and equals zero only in the
limit as φ approaches infinity.
In sum, we conclude that, whenever β is sufficiently small — i.e., smaller than 1/10 and
than τ (φ) , α ≤ 1/10 and γ > 1/10, the centre-left politician 2 should be optimally selected
as the leader in lieu of the most moderate candidate, politician 3. This is because 2 is more
competent, as it can count on two ideologically close trustworthy associates, whereas 3 has
only one; and it is not too much more extremist than 3, as β is small.
It is interesting to compare this situation with the equidistant case in which bi+1 − bi is con-
stant for all i = 1, ..., 4. The simplest way to morph the equidistant case into the case in
which 2 should be selected as leader is to start from the equidistant bias situation in which
bi+1 − bi = β ≤ τ (2β) , i.e., β ≤
√
30/60 ≈ 0.0913 and that the centre-right politician 4 extrem-
izes away from the median, so as to increase b4 − b3 = γ beyond 1/10. Paradoxically, by doing
so, she will make the final optimal decision move towards the opposite ideological direction,
as the centre-left politician 2 will become more competent than the median politician 3.
Another way to morph the equidistant bias case into the situation in which 2 is the optimal
leader is as follows. Suppose that, initially bi+1 − bi = γ > 1/10. Suppose that the leftist
politicians 1 and 2 moderate their views, so that b3 − b2 becomes smaller than τ (φ) and α
becomes smaller than 1/10. As a result, they manage to move the optimal group policy towards
their views, by making the centre-left politician 2 the leader, in lieu of the median politician
3. Putting together these two ideology morphisms, we uncover the value of moderation in this
6example. Moving closer to median may turn policy in the politicians’ ideological direction,
whereas moving far from the median may turn policy in the opposite ideological direction.
Turning to studying the election of the leader by majority vote, we first calculate player 3’s
payoffs for selecting politician 2 or 3 as the leader, using expression (??):
U∗3 (2) = −β2 −
1
6 (1 + 3)
and U∗3 (3) = −
1
6 (3)
,
the median politician 3 will grant leadership to player 2 whenever
U∗3 (2)− U∗3 (3) =
1− 120β2
120
> 0 or β <
√
30
60
.
Hence, we obtain that, whenever β is smaller than
√
30/60 ≈ 0.0913, α ≤ 1/10 and γ > 1/8,
the median politician 3 will prefer to delegate leadership to the centre-left politician 2, instead
of retaining it for herself. In light of Proposition 3, we then conclude that politician 2 is the
Condorcet winner of the election game, when β ≤ √30/60, α ≤ 1/10 and γ > 1/8. Again, this is
because 2 is more competent, as it can count on two ideologically close trustworthy associates,
whereas 3 has only one, and because 2 does not hold views too different from the ones of 3.
And again, this situation can be morphed from the equidistant bias case by assuming that
the centre-right politician 4 extremizes away from the median, so as to increase b4 − b3 = γ
beyond 1/10. Paradoxically, by doing so, she will hurt herself: The centre-left politician 2
becomes more competent than the median politician 3; and defeats 3 in the election game. As
a result, the group’s implemented policy yˆ moves to the left.
Having concluded that the parameter β, the ideological difference between 2 and 3 is cru-
cial in determining who should be selected, or will be elected as the leader, it is interest-
ing to compare election and selection of the leader. Because τ (φ) is strictly decreasing in φ,
τ (1/10) > 1/10 and τ (φ)→ 0 as φ→∞, it is immediate to see that there is a unique threshold
φ¯ > 1/10 such that τ (φ) >
√
30/60 for all φ < φ¯ and τ (φ) <
√
30/60 for all φ > φ¯.
This result implies that, whenever φ < φ¯, there is an interval of the parameter β such that
the centre-left politician 2 should be optimally selected as leader but the median politician
3 is the Condorcet winner of the election game. The result is intuitive: when φ is small so
that δ and 2γ are too large relative to α, the ideological loss borne by the right-wing players
4 and 5 for switching leadership from the median politician 3 to the centre-left politician 2 is
not too large relative to the gain by extreme-left politician 1. This makes selecting 2 as the
leader more likely optimal in the aggregate sense. As the median politician 3 does not care
about the other players payoffs when deciding whether to delegate to 2 or not, she may wind
up suboptimally retaining leadership for herself.
However, a surprising result occurs when φ > φ¯, so that δ and 2γ are sufficiently large relative
to α. For values of β larger than τ (φ) but smaller than
√
30/60, the Condorcet winner is the
centre-left politician 2 despite the fact that optimal leader is the median politician 3. The
intuition is analogous to the case φ < φ¯, although this time, when player 3 disregards the
7other players’ payoffs, she downplays the prerogatives of players 4 and 5, instead of the ones
of player 1. But the result is nevertheless striking. In the election game, the median politician
3 single-handedly delegates leadership to the less moderate politician 2 , despite the fact that
it would be optimal for the group if she retained leadership for herself! 
Analysis of the 6 Player Example in Section 7, Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose that
there are 6 politicians, with ideologies such that bi+1 − bi = β for all i = 1, ..., 5, arranged sym-
metrically around the median ideology zero, so that b3 = −β/2 and b4 = β/2. The leftist biased
politician belong to party A and the rightwing politicians to party B. The values of mA and
mB are immaterial. Unless politicians 2 and 5 can count of more trustworthy advisers than 3
and 4, the latter will be elected in the primaries, and tie the general election, in equilibrium.
Because of symmetry of b, let me now just focus on the challenge between 2 and 3. Because
3 can rely on 2, if 3 communicates to 2 in equilibrium, it follows that 2’s only fighting chance
to be more competent than 3 is that d∗2 = 2 and d∗3 = 1, which requires that β ≤ 1/10 and that
2β > 1/10.
The median voter has bias zero, and decides the general election. Her utility for electing
candidate j is:
U0 (j) = −b2j −
1
6(d∗j + 3)
.
Because of symmetry of b, if U0 (2) > U0(3), then there cannot be an equilibrium in which
party A elects 3 as its candidate in the general election; if they did, in fact, party B would elect
5 as their candidate and win the election. In fact, when U0 (2) > U0(3), the unique equilibrium
of the game has candidates 2 and 5 win the primaries and tie the general election. Simplifying
this condition, we obtain:
U0 (2)− U0 (3) = − (β + β/2)2 − 1
6(2 + 3)
−
[
−(β/2)2 − 1
6(1 + 3)
]
=
1
120
(
1− 240β2) > 0.
Because the last inequality holds if and only if β <
√
15/60, we conclude that when 1/20 <
β <
√
15/60 ≈ 0.0645, the winners of the general election are not the most moderate politicians
3 and 4, despite the fact that politicians’ ideologies are evenly distributed in the ideological
spectrum. 
Analysis of the 5 Player Example in Section 7 and Proof of Proposition 7 Suppose
that there are 5 politicians, with ideologies b1 = −α, b2 = −β, b3 = γ, b4 = γ + δ and b5 =
γ + 2δ. Again, leftist politicians belong to party A and rightwing ones belong to party B. We
assume that γ < β, so that party B is not only majoritarian in the sense that it has more
politicians who can run in the general election, but also in the sense that it can express
a candidate, player 3, with views closer to the median voter in the general election. In this
sense, we say that partyB is ideologically majoritarian in the partition of voters in the general
election. One way to conceptualize this idea is noting that the mid-point M = (−β + γ)/2
8between the ideologies of the marginal politicians in parties A and B is to the left of the
median voter. Hence, if there were no possibility of communicating private information to the
elected policy-holder, party B would always win the election by selecting the most moderate
politician, player 3.
However, the least moderate politician 2 has a fighting chance as gaining the vote of the
median voter in the general election if she is more competent than politician 3. Evidently, this
may only occur if d∗2 = 1 > d∗3 = 0 as there is only another informed politician in party A. This
situation requires that α − β ≤ 1/8, whereas δ > 1/8, so that party A is more ideologically
cohesive, and can express candidates who are more competent than the candidates available
to party B, in the sense that A’s candidate can trust the advice of her party companion,
whereas B’s candidate need to decide on their on. It is then not difficult to find conditions
under which the median voter prefers to elect politician 2 than politician 3. It is enough that
U0 (2)− U0 (3) = −β2 − 1
6(1 + 3)
−
[
−γ2 − 1
6(3)
]
=
1
72
(1− 72∆) > 0,
where ∆ = β2 − γ2. Hence, even if politician 3 were very close to the median voter, she may
still lose the general election because her party, B, is less ideologically cohesive than her
opponent’s party, A. This happens despite the fact that A is ideologically minotarian, as long
the ideological handicap is not too large. Formally, it is required that ∆ = β2 − γ2 = (β −
γ) (β + γ) < 1/72 and this condition can be easily related to the mid-point M = (−β+ γ)/2 < 0
not being too far from zero, the median voter’s ideal point.
To prove the claim that candidate 2 can lose the election by moving closer to the median voter,
suppose that we start from a situation in which α − β is close to 1/8, candidate 2 is barely
within range of 1 for be to be truthful to her. If politician 2 moves ideologically closer to the
median voter (i.e., β decreases), then the condition α− β ≤ 1/8 will not be satisfied anymore,
candidate 2 will lose the informational advantage over 3 and she will lose the election.
To conclude, note that the claim that a candidate can lose the election by moving closer to the
median voter can also be proved by making γ larger and reducing δ so that b4 and b5 remain
constant and b3 moves closer to b4 thereby making it possible to gather its truthful advice. 
